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Negative and positive behaviors that may arise as a result of the budgetary process. 
Managers feel motivated by the budgetary that is used as a basis for evaluating 
performance so that they further improve their performance. This is a positive behavior that 
Budgetary Slack: Information Asymmetry and Emphasis of 
Budgetary as Moderating Effect 
 
	
The purpose of this study empirically to test 
the relationship of budgetary participation 
to budgetary slack with information 
asymmetry and budgetary emphasis as a 
moderating. Some research finds that 
budgetary participation to budgetary slack 
is not consistent, so to be a motivation of 
research to conduct further studies with 
modification of object. The object of this 
study was 22 Regional Government 
Organizations of Tulang Bawang Regency 
with a number of questionnaires distributed 
by 104. Data was processed using SEM. 
Based on the results of the analysis it can be 
concluded that budgetary participation has 
no effect on budgetary slack, information 
asymmetry can strengthen the relationship 
of budgetary participation to budgetary 
slack while the budgetary emphasis is not 
able to strengthen the relationship of 
budgetary participation to budgetary slack. 
The implication of this study is budgetary 
slack can occur to make result of 
performance look good, when budgetary as 
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arises from the budgetary, while the manager's tendency to create budgetary slacks is 
negative behavior arising from the budgetary. Based on these data it can be concluded that 
there is a budgetary slack that can be seen from lower budgetary revenues and higher 
budgetary costs. So that iht shows that the budgetary is not absorbed maximally. This is 
done so that the performance of the local government looks good, because the realization of 
the budgetary achieved always exceeds the predetermined target and the realization of 
expenditure achieved is always lower than the budgetary expenditure previously set 
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007).  
Research related to budgetary slack has been carried out by several researchers 
including Riansyah (2013), Saputri (2017) from several studies there are similarities 
namely using participation of members as independent variables. Several studies have been 
conducted on factors that can lead to a tendency to create budgetary slack. One that is 
considered to have a tendency to slack is Budgetary Participation. Budgetary participation 
is a process that describes individuals involved in budgetary and has an influence on 
budgetary targets and the need for rewards for achieving these budgetary targets 
(Falikhatun in Irfan 2016). Research conducted by Dunk (1993), Dewi and Erawati (2014), 
Alfebriano (2013), Tresnayani (2016) and Raudhiah (2014) shows that participation 
influences the budgetary slack. Whereas Utami (2012), Mahadewi (2014), Anggasta 
(2014), Pratama (2013) and Yanti and Mariam (2016) show opposite results namely with 
the existence of participation in the budgetary process, opportunities will arise to create a 
slack in the budgetary. 
Inconsistency of the results is the motivation of researchers to carry out further 
studies. This research was conducted on public sector organizations with the object of 
research in the Regional Work Unit (OPD) of Tulang Bawang Regency. The choice of 
location is due to an interesting phenomenon that occurs in the process of drafting the 
Regional Budgetary (APBD) in Tulang Bawang Regency Government, namely the 
budgetary realization report which shows that budgetary income is always lower and 
budgetary costs are higher than budgetary.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPHOTESIS 
Agency Theory 
One of the things underlying an agency's theory is that principals and agents have 
different intentions and objectives or often their interests clash (Anthony and Govindarajan, 
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2007). According to the principal view, the compensation given is based on the results, 
while according to the opinion of the agent, the compensation system does not merely see 
the results but also the level of effort it does to achieve the results (Yanti and Mariam, 
2016).  
Yanti and Mariam (2016) argue that these agency relationships will result in two 
problems i.e. the occurrence of: (a) information asymmetry, where management generally 
has more information on actual financial position and position Operating entity from the 
owner, and (b) the occurrence of a conflict of interest due to the inequality of such interests 
or purposes, where management does not necessarily act in the interest of the owner. 
 
Budgetary Slack 
Sholihin (2016) and Saputri (2017) stated that lower-level managers tried to insist on 
committing slack if they had the hope of gaining more profit in the budget participation 
process, and expecting the award Agent in the achievement of budget. The manager 
commits a slack in his budget in order to protect his personal gains and it is a rational 
behavior (Armaeni, 2012). 
The budgetary slack is defined as the difference in the amount of budget raised with 
the best estimate of an organization or the difference between the actual resources needed 
to effectively complete a job, with Added resources to complete the work (Arfan, 
2010:241). The budgetary slack is the difference between the actual budget can be achieved 
with the budget to be delivered (Yanti and Mariam, 2016). 
 
Budgetary Participation 
Mahadewi and Saputri (2017), explained that the participation of budgets as one of 
the objectives of the management control system will encourage managers to be more 
effective and efficient in achieving the goals of the organization. Falikhatu and Riansah 
(2013) said that budgeting participation is a process by which individuals are directly 
engaged in it and have an influence on the preparation of the budget target whose 
performance will be evaluated and the possibilities will be rewarded on the basis of 
achieving their budget targets.  
 
Information Asymmetry 
Mahadewi and Saputri (2017) state that information asymmetry appears in situations 
where the owner or employer does not have sufficient information about his or her 
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subordinate performance, so that the owner or employer cannot determine exactly how 
Agents contribute to the actual results of the company. Superiors may have more 
knowledge than subordinates about subordinate responsibility units, as well as vice versa. 
 
Budgetary Emphasys  
Budget emphasis (budget emphasis) is the insistor of superiors on subordinates to 
implement a well-established budget (Putra, 2012:52). This opinion is supported by Irfan 
and Lukman (2016:160) who defines the budget emphasis as a insistent on subordinates on 
the subordinate to implement a well-crafted budget, which is sanctioned if less than the 
target budget and compensation If able to exceed the target budget. 
 
Budgetary Participation and Budgetary Slack 
According to Latuheru (2005) Participation in budget is an effective way to align the 
objectives of the accountability center with the objectives of the organization thoroughly 
and with participation in the process of drafting the budget, the budgetary slack will be 
greater because the individual has an opportunity to manipulate the budget to meet his or 
her personal interests. It is supported by Utami (2012) and Pratama (2013) that shows the 
results that budgetary participation affects the budgetary slack. Based on the description, 
the hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H1 : Budget participation affects budgetary slack.  
 
Asymmetry Information, budgetary participation and budgetary slack 
Asymmetry of information occurs between principals and agents participating in 
budgeting can cause a budgetary slack. Because, the assessed performance of the budget 
achievement level becomes the agent's motivation for asymmetry of information to 
facilitate the achievement of the budget. The study, supported by Young (1985); Utomo 
(2006); Fadhilah (2011) and Falikhatun (2007); Djasul and Fadilah (2011) that the 
interaction of participatory budgeting information significant to relation of budgetary slack 
and budgetary slack. Based on the description, the hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
H2 : Budgetary participation affects budgetary slack with information asymmetry as a 
moderate. 
 
Budgetary Emphasis, budgetary participation and budgetary slack  
Budgetary emphasis is a insistor on the superiors of subordinates to implement a 
well-established budget. Performance measurement based on the budget that has been 
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compiled makes the subordinates will try to obtain profitable variance by creating slack, 
among others by lowering the income and increasing the cost during the budget preparation 
(Rani , 2015). If an employee's performance assessment is determined by the budget that 
has been drafted, the subordinates tend to do the budget. Budgetary emphasis is the 
likelihood of achieving a successful budget in the easiest way possible. (Gamal 2001, in 
Irfan 2017). When a budget is the only benchmark of an employee's performance 
assessment or subordinate in an agency, the employee or subordinate will be more likely to 
do things in improving its performance to look good and continue to gain confidence 
(Anggasta, 2014). This budgetary emphasis will be the pressure for subordinates to provide 
the best by looking for certain profitable opportunities and these opportunities that will 
cause a slack (Sujana, 2010).  It is supported by Armaeni (2012) which suggests that the 
emphasis budgetary strengthening can affect relationship of budgetary participation on the 
slack based on the explanation above, can be formulated as the following hypothesis: 
















3. RESESARCH METHOD  
The data source used in this research is primary data, primary Data is obtained 
through survey methods using questionnaires shared to respondents. This method is done 
by asking the respondent a question, which is measured using a Likert 1-5 scale. The data 
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The instruments in this study were adopted from several sources, budgetary 
participation (Begum, 2016); budgetary slack (Supriyatno, 2016); information asymmetry 
(Novita, 2009); budgetary emphasis (Rani, 2015). The questionnaire in this study will be 
distributed on June 2019 to officials or officials of the Tulang Bawang Regency 
Government as many as 22 Regional Government Organizations (OPD). Data analysis 
method in this study uses SEM (Structural Equation Modelling) analysis techniques which 
are operated through PLS (Partial Least Squares) to answer the hypothesis. 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The AVE and communality values> 0.50, thus fulfilling the rule of thumb 
requirements used for convergent validity. According (Ghozali, 2013) Discriminant 
validity of the measurement model with reflexive indicators is assessed based on cross 
loading measurements with the construct’ The results of the Composite Reliability this 
study test reliability on the measurement model (outer model) on the reflective indicator by 
looking at the value of Composite Reliability. Indicators are declared reliable or have good 
reliability if the Composite Reliability value is> 0.70.  
From the results of the analysis found the R-square value for the endogenous latent 
variable is 0.720, which means that this model can explain 13.74% of changes in the 
endogenous latent variable Y1 and the remaining 86.26% is explained by other factors 
beyond those studied. In this study the hypothesis can be seen from the value of the T-
statistic. Exogenous variables are stated to have a direct effect on endogenous variables if 





     
From the table 1 can be explain that the hypothesis test results show that between 
budgetary participation and budgetary slack has a value of T-statistics (0.905) <Ttable (1.65) 
with a significance level of 5% (two tailed), which is 0.366 indicating that budgetary 







|O/STERR P value 
X1 -> Y 0.122 0.127 0.135 0.905 0.366 
X1*X2 -> Y 0.288 -0.260 0.131 2.202 0.028 
X1*X3 -> Y 0.179 0.160 0.168 1.067 0.287 
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participation has no a significant effect on budgetary slack. This means that hypothesis 1 is 
rejected. The effect of budgetary participation on budgetary slack with information 
asymmetry as a moderating variable has the value of T-stastistics (2.202) > T-table (1.65) with a 
significance of 5% (two tailed) and p-value 0.028, indicating budgetary interaction with 
asymmetry information has a significant effect, meaning that information asymmetry is 
able to influence the budgetary participation relationship to budgetary slack. This means 
that hypothesis 2 is accepted. The interaction of budgetary participation on budgetary slack 
as a budgetary emphasis moderating variable has a T-stastistics value (1.067) <T-table (1.65) 
with a significance level of 5% (two tailed), and P-value 0.287 shows the interaction 
between budgetary participation and budgetary emphasis there is no a significant influence. 
This means that hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Based on the results of the analysis and discussion it can be concluded that budgetary 
participation does not affect budgetary slack, interaction of budgetary slack with 
asymmetry information has a significant effect, meaning that information asymmetry is 
able to influence the budgetary participation relationship on budgetary slack. The budgetary 
emphasis cannot moderating interaction of budgetary participation on budgetary slack.  
 
6. IMPLICATION  
Result this study can be used by government to see that budgetary slack can occur to 
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